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 
Abstract—Advent of 5G technologies has ensued in massive 
growth of body-centric communications (BCC), especially at 
millimeter-wave frequencies. As a result, the portable/handheld 
terminals are becoming more and more “intelligent” but not 
without the cost of being less secure. Improved authentication 
measures need to be explored, as effective identity authentication 
is the first level of security in these devices. This paper presents a 
novel keyless authentication method exploiting wireless channel 
characteristics. Human palm has distinct transmission coefficient 
(S21) for each of the users and is used for in-vivo fingerprint 
identification in this work. A detailed channel modeling using 
data acquisition from real environment and empirical approach is 
adopted to evaluate the usability of this method. The results show 
that this method can provide a secure operation for the 
millimeter-wave 5G BCCs. 
 
Index Terms—Body-centric communications, 5G, Authentication, 
Security. 
 
I. INTRODUCTION 
IRELESS technologies have seen rapid development and 
massive expansion in recent years. The global market 
value of wearable wireless devices alone is estimated to hit $32 
billion mark by 2020 [1] 5G is the next big step in wireless 
technologies that would enable ubiquitous portable systems 
realizing the Internet of Things (IoT). Millimeter-wave 
frequency range is considered the favorite candidate for the 
portable 5G applications for Body-centric Networks and the 
next generation wireless local access networks (WLANs) due 
to bandwidth availability, higher throughput and low cost 
circuit solutions based on advanced CMOS technology [2]. 
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Miniaturized size of the devices at this frequency band also 
brings in great level of attraction. 
Though, high molecular resonance results in higher 
atmospheric attenuation at millimeter-wave (mmWave) 
frequencies, at distances lower than 1 km, rain and the 
atmospheric attenuation on millimeter-wave link at 28-38 GHz 
is very weak and would not result in communication failure [3]. 
mmWave communication is therefore, suitable for local or 
personal communication covering a distance of few meters and 
has attracted lots of attention from both academia and industry. 
Reliability of any wireless communication technology 
including 5G has unfathomable dependence on the 
performance of the antenna and propagation link. 
Millimeter-wave operation in Body-centric Networks requires 
the antenna and associated electronics to support increased data 
rate, larger bandwidth, higher gain, low profile and insensitivity 
to the human user presence [1]. It necessitates novel antenna 
designs and efficient channel characterization. These topics 
have gained high interest from the researchers recently. Liu et 
al. have discussed the design and working of a 60 GHz chip 
package for the practical application cycle of 5G [4]. 
Channel characterization studies are now spanning towards 
mmWave frequencies [5, 6]. Rappaport has devised a path loss 
model for millimeter-wave indoor propagation at 73 GHz and 
28 GHz [7]. A 3D millimeter-wave statistical channel model 
for the 5G applications is proposed in [8]. In [9], a statistical 
signal receiving model has been proposed for the BCC channel 
working at mmWave range. Though, these studies have 
reported preliminary work and promising results in this 
direction, further research is needed to characterize the 
propagation environment [10].  
Efficient antenna design and channel characterization need 
understanding of the effects caused by the human body 
presence in the vicinity. Human body presence deteriorate the 
performance of wireless devices especially antennas caused by 
frequency detuning, impedance mismatch and radiation pattern 
distortions [11]. The radiation performance of the antenna is 
strongly dependent on the positioning of the device on-body, as 
well as the user’s sex, height and body mass index [12, 13]. It is 
concluded in [14] that the human body presence at 60 GHz may 
cause a drop of 18-36 dB in the power level due to the blocking 
effect. 
Human body models are vastly used nowadays to 
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accomplish it [1]. The electric properties of human tissues vary 
with frequency. In order to accurately simulate or create a 
human body model, the dispersion characteristics of different 
tissues must be considered. Study of the interaction of the 
mmWaves and the human body has revealed that the 
electromagnetic field is almost completely restricted in the skin 
layer. The main safety problem is the heating of the eyes and 
the skin due to absorption of mmWave energy and their 
non-ionizing nature. Therefore, a skin equivalent numerical 
model is considered to deliver sufficient information on 
antenna-human body interaction at mmWave frequencies [1]. 
Moreover, due to the extremely small wavelength of the 
millimeter-wave frequencies (1–10 mm) compared to the 
human body size, it is reasonable to model the human skin as a 
semi-infinite plane [15]. Due to short range, creeping waves 
and surface waves have a good potential to contribute to 
on-body mmWave wireless channel [13]. In addition, more 
than 95% body energy absorption can be reduced because of 
the shielding effect. 
The BCCs have major applications in the area of wireless 
healthcare where physiological attributes of a patient are being 
monitored and treatment is being provided remotely. This 
involves transmission and processing of large amount of very 
personal information of the user by medical devices connected 
through the internet. It makes this information vulnerable to 
destruction or eavesdropping that could lead to devastating 
consequences at personal as well as commercial levels [1, 16]. 
Moreover, essential conditions of security in any form of 
communications are non-falsifiable [17]. It necessitates new 
security measures to ensure utmost level of personal safety. 
Identity authentication is the first line of defense against any 
security infringement. Various techniques have been adopted to 
establish authenticity of the user in BCCs. Voice prints have 
been used for security in [18]. However this approach is found 
to affect privacy of the user and novel identification methods 
are required to deal with it. 
This paper addresses the issue of security in mmWave BCCs 
by combining the channel characterization and identification. It 
exploits potential use of the creeping waves and surface waves 
as a novel keyless method for the authentication purposes. To 
best of our knowledge, it is a first attempt in this direction. 
Following the introduction in this section, the rest of the 
paper is organized into six sections. Section II characterizes 
effects of human hand presence on body-centric channel. 
Section III proposes a novel keyless authentication method for 
the mmWave body-centric channel based on wireless channel 
characterization. Conclusion are drawn Section IV. 
II. EFFECT OF HUMAN HAND ON BODY-CENTRIC CHANNEL 
Majority of the body-centric applications are portable and 
handheld where human hand and palm is the integral element 
devising performance of such devices. Due to the hostile nature 
of the human body, characterization of the human hand 
presence at 5G frequencies; especially mmWave range is of 
profound importance before using it as a means for security and 
identification. 
According to the Federal Communications Commission 
(FCC), the U.S. is being the first country to open high-band 
spectrum for 5G networks and technologies [19]. The 5G 
services are allocated four new frequency bands of 28 GHz 
(27.5-28.35 GHz), 37 GHz (37-38.6 GHz), 39 GHz (38.6-40 
GHz) and an unlicensed band at 64-71 GHz. Since a universally 
accepted definition of 5G frequencies is still not available, we 
have focused our work to study the performance of 5G 
applications operating at 28 GHz (27.5-28.35 GHz). 
This study establishes the effects of the human hand and 
palm on mmWave applications through measurements as it 
offers the advantages of more reliable results due to true 
replication of a realistic working environment. Moreover, it can 
avoid the information loss that could take place due to 
imprecise manufacturing of artificial phantoms and hence, 
could serve as a benchmark for experimentation done using 
artificial phantoms. Path loss is estimated in terms of 
transmission coefficient (S21) measured using Agilent’s 
E8363B Vector Network Analyzer (VNA). Since, flat and 
grasped postures are the two most common hand actions, two 
representative test configurations of ‘palm flat’ and ‘palm fist’ 
are considered to evaluate effects of the hand on mmWave 
wireless channel. Two centre-alligned horn antennas operating 
at 28 GHz and separated by a distance of 270 mm are used as 
the transmitter and receiver to increase the directivity. Fig. 1 
shows the measurement setup with key dimensions. 
 
 
 
(a)  
 
 
 
(b)  
 
Fig. 1. Experimental setup showing, (a) key dimensions (b) actual measurement 
scenario. 
 
The measurement results of the path loss (S21) with curve 
fitting are summarized in Fig. 2. The results are a clear 
indication that the influence of the palm on the channel is very 
significant due to the short wavelength of the mmWave 
frequency band. The two considered postures of the hand 
affects the channel distinctly due to varying extents of link 
blockage. The hand in fist posture introduces relatively larger 
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3 
loss (with minimum path loss of -37 dB) as compared to flat 
posture (with minimum path loss of -24 dB) due to effectively 
larger blocking area. 
 
 
 
Fig. 2. Measured path loss for on-palm body-centric channel with linear 
regression (continuous line, n= -2.49 or -7.35) considering two postures of the 
hand, (a) flat palm configuration, (b) fisted palm configuration, (c) effects of 
flat hand on the channel (d) effects of fisted hand on the channel. 
 
To evaluate the stability, repeatability and reliability of the 
path loss, repeated measurements are carried out using the same 
human subject at different time instances. The path loss (S21) 
results for the flat palm and fisted palm configurations are 
given in Figs. 3 and 4, respectively. 
 
 
Fig. 3. Path loss measurements with first order linear regression for flat palm 
hand posture. 
 
 
 
Fig. 4. Path loss measurements with first order linear regression for fisted palm 
hand posture. 
 
By least squares fitting, we can get the straight line fit in Figs. 
3 and 4, which represents the stability of human body effects on 
the radio wave channel characteristics. The channel effect 
factor for a certain hand posture on the wireless channel given 
in Table I can be calculated considering the following 
equations: 
 
∑ 𝑥𝑖𝑗𝛽𝑗 = 𝑦𝑖
𝑛
𝑗=1  , (𝑖 = 1,2,3 … 𝑚)                       (1) 
 
where 𝑚 represents the 𝑚 equations, 𝑛 represents 𝑛 unknown 
𝛽 parameter, 𝑚 > 𝑛, to quantify the equations: 
 
𝑋 = [
𝑥11 𝑥12 ⋯ 𝑥1𝑛
𝑥21
⋮
𝑥𝑚1
𝑥22
⋮
𝑥𝑚2
⋯
⋱
…
𝑥2𝑛
⋮
𝑥𝑚𝑛
] , 𝛽 = [
𝛽1
𝛽2
⋮
𝛽𝑛
] , 𝑦 = [
𝑦1
𝑦2
⋮
𝑦𝑛
]       (2) 
 
Considering the residual sum of squares function: 
 
𝑆(𝛽) = ‖𝑋𝛽 − 𝑦‖2                               (3) 
 
when 𝛽 = ?̂?, 𝑆(𝛽), minimum value can be obtained: 
 
?̂? = 𝑎𝑟𝑔𝑚𝑖𝑛(𝑆(𝛽))                            (4) 
 
by differential 𝑆(𝛽): 
 
𝑋𝑇𝑋?̂? = 𝑋𝑇𝑦                                  (5) 
?̂? = (𝑋𝑇𝑋)−1𝑋𝑇𝑦                              (6) 
 
TABLE I 
EFFECT FACTOR OF DIFFERENT HAND POSTURES ON THE 
WIRELESS CHANNEL 
 
It is evident from these results that the same hand posture 
generates similar profile of the path loss at mmWave 
frequencies resulting in a stable channel response to that 
specific posture. These results also show that the effects of the 
hand presence can be characterized and accounted for in 
advance through channel measurements. Moreover, since the 
size of the human body is huge as compared to mmWave 
wavelength and mmWaves has an exponential decay waveform 
in the human body, it is being absorbed in the superficial layer 
of the body making human skin as the primary affected area. It 
can be explained by analyzing the anatomy of the human skin 
that can be divided into two layers [15], outer epidermis and 
dermis layer. The thickness of the epidermis and dermis varies 
in the range of 0.06-0.1 mm and 1.2-2.8 mm, respectively. The 
most superficial layer of the epidermis is called the stratum 
corneum, with a thickness of 0.012-0.018 mm. Since, mmWave 
energy decays very rapidly in moist tissues, it penetrates the 
stratum corneum easily that has low water content of 15-40%. 
However, it will be absorbed in the deep epidermis and dermis 
quickly and cannot propagate into body further [20-21]. In [22], 
mmWave signal penetration depth in the skin has been 
confirmed to be approximately 3 mm at 28 GHz. The human 
skin can therefore, be modeled as a semi-infinite plane to the 
incident mmWaves [15]. Hence, the reflection coefficient from 
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4 
arbitrary wave front has a parallel and a perpendicular 
polarization on the surface of the skin and air: 
𝑅 𝑝𝑎𝑟𝑎𝑙𝑙𝑒𝑙 = |
−𝜀∗ cos 𝛼+√𝜀∗−𝑠𝑖𝑛2𝛼
𝜀∗ cos 𝛼+√𝜀∗−𝑠𝑖𝑛2𝛼
|                       (7) 
 
𝑅 𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑝𝑒𝑛𝑑𝑖𝑐𝑢𝑙𝑎𝑟 = |
cos 𝛼−√𝜀∗−𝑠𝑖𝑛2𝛼
cos 𝛼+√𝜀∗−𝑠𝑖𝑛2𝛼
|                    (8) 
where α  is the incident angle, R parallel  and R perpendicular 
are  power  reflection coefficients, 1 − R parallel  and 1 −
R perpendicular are  power transmission coefficient.  
This discussion leads us to two interesting conclusions. First, 
that the wireless channel has a distinct signature for varying 
body configurations and it has unique profile of variation for 
different postures with good stability at mmWave range as 
compared to a quasi-static behavior at below 30 MHz 
frequencies [23]. Second that mmWave offers wide range of 
changes in the distribution interval and less collision 
probability making it easier to distinguish between the 
individuals through channel parameters. These observations 
combined with the fact that body-centric channels are subject 
specific and have strong dependence on the user’s gender, 
height, age and body-mass index as well as on-body position of 
the wireless device [1, 13, 24], make mmWave channel 
characteristics a potentially very useful tool for identity 
authentication. Following section presents a detailed discusses 
on its viability. 
III. IDENTITY AUTHENTICATION THROUGH MMWAVE 
CHANNEL CHARACTERIZATION 
Body-centric networks have made remarkable progress in 
recent years. However, security challenges such as lack of 
confidence, reliability and data privacy are deterring them from 
mass acceptance [1]. Common threats include hardware 
failures, software errors, wireless radio penetration, malware 
vulnerability, and side-channel attacks. Unlike a 
communication base station, body-centric communication 
equipment cannot have a steady stream of power supply. Also, 
they have to adhere to a small and limited form factor that 
makes deployment of traditional security measures not feasible. 
Researchers have studied use of channel propagation 
characteristics for security. In [25], tunable capacitors have 
been used to achieve different bias voltage resulting in varying 
frequency response. These different frequency responses are 
then used for device identification. Bhargav et al. have clarified 
the κ–μ fading channels secrecy capacity [26]. Recently, 
physical layer security methods based on characterization of 
the wireless channel are found to be a useful alternative to this 
ongoing problem. Compared to authentication based on digital 
key, physical layer authentication is closely related to the 
communication equipment and communication environment 
making it extremely difficult to counterfeit. In addition, 
channel as well as the device would estimate any 
communication problem and the compensation techniques are 
the inherent function of both the sender and the receiver. 
Therefore, authentication based on the physical layer can be 
accomplished without additional overhead. Notably, the brute 
force attack, which is a great trouble in traditional cryptography, 
can be alleviated effectively by the physical layer parameters. 
The inherent features of short communication distance and 
directional antennas of this mmWave wireless channel offers 
added benefits for the security and authentication. Due to the 
transmission limitations, the receiver needs to be located at 
closer distances. It removes the threat of eavesdropping by far 
located attackers. Furthermore, mmWave communications use 
highly directional antennas with narrow beams to overcome 
high path loss. It will result in low signal-to-noise ratio at the 
attackers end limiting his ability to snoop the information. This 
section focuses on exploiting radio and propagation 
characteristics of mmWave channel at 28 GHz to implement a 
new authentication method. 
A. Measurement Set-up 
The existing wireless equipment cannot achieve acceptable 
level of authentication in the actual environment. It is therefore, 
necessary to explore new ways for certification. This section 
introduces the experimental design of identity authentication 
through channel measurements. S21 is employed to 
characterize the wireless channel. We need to consider a 
number of factors while designing the experiment due to 
unavailability of the relevant information at 28 GHz frequency 
range.  
In [27], it has been concluded that achieving a 
non-line-of-sight on-body communication channel at mmWave 
frequencies is very difficult because of the typical shadow 
fading. A face-to-face system structure is found to be useful in 
such a situation [28]. The penetration of the mmWave is 
restricted to the human skin [20-21]. The horn antennas are a 
proven efficient choice to measure wireless channel at 28 GHz 
body-centric networks due to higher directionality interference 
minimization [29, 30]. Based on these findings, we have 
designed our experiment to have a face-to-face system structure 
with directional horn antennas as the transmitter and receiver. 
 
 
Fig. 5. Human subject age and gender characteristics with antenna radiation 
parameters, (a) subject characteristics, (b) horn antenna and waveguide coaxial 
converter parameters. 
 
The experimental set-up is similar as shown in Fig. 1. Two 
WR28 horn antennas facing each other and the Agilent E8363B 
VNA are used to acquire S21 information for the on-body 
channel with varying hand postures. The horn antennas have a 
gain of 20 dB. They are separated by a distance of 270 mm and 
placed at a height of 39 mm. The antennas are connected to the 
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VNA using 70 cm long coaxial cables and 
waveguide-to-coaxial converters.  
To avoid possible device and system errors in the experiment, 
conventional procedure of calibration is performed for the 
VNA. Losses in the cables and converters are also measured 
and taken into account via calibration. In order to prevent 
electrostatic damage to the instrument, all experiments are 
conducted on the anti-static test-bed. 
Microwave-absorbing material is placed in the surrounding 
to reduce interference. Fig. 5 shows the radiation parameters of 
the horn antennas and the converters. 
Five human subjects of roughly same physique and size have 
been used in this study. Ten sets of data have been recorded for 
each of the human subject. Authentication has been achieved 
through observing a distinct channel profile, a unique in-vivo 
fingerprint, for each of the human subjects. 
B. Results and Analysis 
 
Fig. 6. In-vivo channel profile of five human subjectsfor flat palm configuration 
(continuous line indicates mean value and error bar represents standard 
deviation). 
The measurement results of the in-vivo channel profile with 
human hand presence associated to the five human subjects are 
shown in Fig. 6. The blue line indicates the average curve of the 
10 measured data sets while the red bars illustrate standard 
deviation. Both parameters show that the results for the five test 
subjects have significant differences and unique profile 
enabling them to be clearly distinguishable even without a need 
of post-processing. The results also exhibit good stability 
through high repeatability of the measurements. Moreover, 
different test subjects have produced different power levels due 
to slightly different electric properties of the hand tissues. 
These observations are in good agreement with the previous 
studies.  
To investigate the strength of the proposed physical layer 
authentication method, the raw data measurements of the 
channel profile for the five test subjects are plotted and 
compared in Fig. 7. Correlation coefficients between these S21 
sequences and effect factor are then calculated and summarized 
in Table II. 
 
 
 
Fig. 7. In-vivo channel response of five participants, raw data (scatter plot), 
linear fitting (continuous line). 
 
TABLE II  
CORRELATION COEFFICIENTS FOR IN-VIVO CHANNEL 
RESPONSE OF THE FIVE TEST SUBJECTS (FIG. 6) AND EFFECT 
FACTOR IN FIG. 7 
 
 
Comparison of the plots in Fig. 7 shows that there is a good 
discrimination between the five data sets associated to the five 
test subjects. The magnified observation of the data sets further 
establishes that the five test subjects influences the wireless 
channel differently with a distinct S21 sequence, even in the 
areas that seem similar at first look. The effect factor shown in 
terms of the linear fitting indicates that despite having different 
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power levels, overall channel response is consistent and stable 
for different users. These observations are also in agreement 
with the calculations presented in Table II. It is quite certain 
from this discussion that the S21 data in this body-centric 
wireless communication link is subject specific and stable. It 
can therefore, be used as a good means to identify the right user 
and provide authentication. 
 
 
Fig. 8. In-vivo channel profile of five human subjects for fisted palm 
configuration (continuous line indicates mean value and error bar represents 
standard deviation). 
Through Fig. 6 (palm flat) and Fig.8 (palm fist), it can be 
found that, the error bars are almost close to the S21 data mean 
line, this shows that the mmWave body centric wireless 
channel characterization has good measurement repeatability in 
the above scenarios and for different users.  
Moreover, it can also be seen that age and gender of the 
subjects, as given in Fig. 5(a), have little impact on the 
experimental results. Although small, the S21 characteristics 
are mainly affected due to different physical attributes of an 
individual’s palm like size and shape. The skin layer also brings 
slight changes to mmWave propagation.  
The fisting action (movement of hand from flat palm to 
closed palm) results in larger error as compared to the static 
condition of fisted palm. This is evident from the larger 
variation in the error bars in measurement data for subject No. 5 
in Fig. 8. It is therefore concluded that the mmWave channel 
information can result in better identification levels with good 
distinction and repeatability for bare palm and static hand 
configurations. Repeatability is also evident from the results 
given in Figs. 6 and 8 where same human subjects are used to 
collect data with only a small level of discrepancies. 
Furthermore, these results also indicate that flat palm and fisted 
palm only slightly changes the results ensuring high level of 
repeatability. 
As a new biometric feature proposed from the perspective of 
antenna and propagation, this paper focuses on pointing out its 
feasibility and usefulness compared to the traditional 
bio-recognition methods such as fingerprint and iris.   
Its advantages include robustness due to flexible nature of 
the wireless channel. Moreover, the three-dimensional 
propagation space of the wireless signal enables this 
authentication method to extend the general two-dimensional 
biometrics into three or even four dimensions (three spatial 
dimensions plus the time dimension). These higher dimensions 
can provide richer features, more reliable and more flexible 
authentication. On top of that, this authentication method for 
the mmWave body-centric systems relies on the channel 
feature extraction using S21 which is a typical part of practical 
communication applications. Hence, it needs almost no 
additional hardware making it extremely cost-effective.  
Despite offering high level of security with minimum 
overhead, the keyless physical authentication is only possible if 
the assailant cannot imitate the legitimate channel. Variations 
in the antenna radiation pattern due to proximity of the human 
body could also limit its applicability. Moreover, different 
antenna types may also affect the data acquisition to a small 
extent. Though mmWave body-centric channels are less 
affected by these two degrading factors, work to furnish a more 
realistic radiation model is needed to completely rectify these 
problems. 
IV. CONCLUSION 
The next generation of consumer wireless systems (5G) is on 
the horizon. This system would be a key part of the mmWave 
body-centric communications. Authentication and security 
issues are currently one of the major issues faced by the 
body-centric networks. Very limited work is available on this 
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topic at present, especially for the systems operating at 28 GHz 
frequency range. 
A novel keyless authentication method for the 28 GHz 
mmWave body-centric systems has been proposed. This 
technique is based on the wireless channel response to the 
presence of the human hand. As a prelude to the authentication 
method, the subject specificity, repeatability and stability of the 
28 GHz wireless channel have been established through S21 
measurements. The experimental measurements and numerical 
analysis has shown that the channel reacts quite 
discriminatorily to different hand postures and different users. 
It has been shown that this channel characteristic can be used 
effectively to identify the right user and authenticate the data 
usage. Moreover, this physical layer based security in 
body-centric communications can be accomplished without any 
additional overhead. It makes it a suitable candidate for short 
range and directive mmWave communication links. This study 
is first attempt in physical layer mmWave channel security and 
presents very encouraging results. Work is in progress to 
further evaluate its usefulness in order to assess the False 
Acceptance Rate (FAR) and False Rejection Rate (FRR) 
scenarios. 
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